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Abstract
Membership Inference Attack (MIA) determines the
presence of a record in a machine learning model’s train-
ing data by querying the model. Prior work has shown
that the attack is feasible when the model is overfitted to
its training data or when the adversary controls the train-
ing algorithm. However, when the model is not overfitted
and the adversary does not control the training algorithm,
the threat is not well understood. In this paper, we report a
study that discovers overfitting to be a sufficient but not a
necessary condition for an MIA to succeed. More specifi-
cally, we demonstrate that even a well-generalized model
contains vulnerable instances subject to a new general-
ized MIA (GMIA). In GMIA, we use novel techniques for
selecting vulnerable instances and detecting their subtle
influences ignored by overfitting metrics. Specifically,
we successfully identify individual records with high pre-
cision in real-world datasets by querying black-box ma-
chine learning models. Further we show that a vulnerable
record can even be indirectly attacked by querying other
related records and existing generalization techniques are
found to be less effective in protecting the vulnerable in-
stances. Our findings sharpen the understanding of the
fundamental cause of the problem: the unique influences
the training instance may have on the model.
1 Introduction
The recent progress on machine learning has brought
in a new wave of technological innovations, ranging from
automatic driving, face recognition, natural language pro-
cessing to intelligent marketing, advertising, healthcare
data management, etc. To support the emerging machine
learning ecosystem, major cloud providers are pushing
Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS), providing com-
puting platforms and learning frameworks to help their
customers conveniently train their own models based
upon the datasets they upload. Prominent examples in-
clude Amazon Machine Learning (ML), Google Predic-
tion API, and Microsoft Azure Machine Learning. The
models trained on these platforms can be made avail-
able by the data owners to their users for online queries.
What is less clear are the privacy implications of these ex-
ported models, particularly whether uncontrolled queries
on them could lead to exposure of training data that often
includes sensitive content such as purchase preferences,
patients’ health information, and recorded commands and
online behavior.
Membership inference attack. Prior research demon-
strates that a membership inference attack (MIA) can
succeed on overfitted models with only black-box access
to the model [32]. In such an attack, the adversary, who
can only query a given target model without knowing
its internal parameters, can determine whether a specific
record is inside the model’s training dataset. This type of
attacks can have a significant privacy implication such as
re-identifying a cancer patient whose data is used to train
a classification model. For this purpose, the prior research
trains an attack model that utilizes the target model’s clas-
sification result for a given input to determine whether the
input is present in the target model’s training set. Such
an attack model can be constructed using labeled datasets
generated by a set of shadow models trained to imitate the
behaviors of the target model. This approach is effective
when the target models are overfitted to training data.
It remains unclear whether it is feasible to perform MIA
on well-generalized models with only black-box access.
This problem should be distinguished from prior attacks
on non-overfitted models under a different adversarial
model. In these attacks, the adversary controls the train-
ing algorithm and stealthily embeds information in the
model [33, 39].
Rethinking ML privacy risk. In our research, we re-
visited the threat of MIA, in an attempt to answer the
following questions: (1) is overfitting a root cause of
membership disclosure from a machine learning model?
(2) if so, is generalization the right answer to the problem?
(3) if not, what indeed causes the information leak? The
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findings of our study, though still not fully addressing
these issues, make a step closer toward that end, helping
us better understand the threat of MIA.
(1) Is overfitting a root cause of membership disclosure
from a machine learning model?
We discover that overfitting, as considered in evalu-
ating machine learning models, can be sufficient but is
by no means necessary for exposing membership infor-
mation from training data. As evidence, we run a new
MIA (called generalized MIA or GMIA) that successfully
identifies some individuals in the training sets from three
neural-network models, for predicting salary class, cancer
diagnosis and written digits, even when these models are
not overfitted. Particularly, our attack automatically picks
5 vulnerable patient samples from the Cancer dataset [26],
16 images from the MNIST dataset [24], and 13 individu-
als from the Adult dataset [26] as the attack object. We
identified 73.88% of the models, from which the target
images in the MNIST dataset can be inferred with a pre-
cision of 93.36%. Similarly, we inferred the presence of
target patients in the Cancer dataset with a precision of
88.89% in 3.2% of the models and the presence of tar-
get individuals in the Adult dataset with a precision of
73.91% in 5.23% of the models.
Further interesting is the observation that the adversary
does not even need to query the models for the target
record to determine its presence, as it does in the prior
research: instead, the adversary can search for different
but related records and use their classifications by models
to determine the object’s membership in the training data.
(2) Is generalization the right solution for membership
disclosure?
We find that existing regularization approaches are in-
sufficient to defeat our attack, which can still determine
the presence of an image in the MNIST dataset in 34%
of all the models with a precision of 100% even when
L2 regularization is applied. This finding deviates from
what is reported in the prior research, whose MIA can be
effectively suppressed by regularization [32].
(3) What is the fundamental cause of membership disclo-
sure?
We observe that such information leaks are caused by
the unique influences a specific instance in the training
set can have on the learning model. The influences affect
the model’s outputs (i.e., predictions) with regards to a
single or multiple inputs. So once the adversary has asked
enough questions, no guarantee will be there that he can-
not capture the influences (possibly from multiple queries)
to infer the presence of a certain training instance. It is
important to note that overfitting is essentially a special
case of such unique influences but the generic situation
is much more complicated. In detection of overfitting,
we look for an instance’s positive impact on a model’s
accuracy for the training set and limited/negative impact
for the testing set. On the contrary, finding the unique
influences in general needs to consider the case when an
instance both contributes useful information to the model
for predicting other instances and brings in noise uniquely
characterizing itself. The model generalization methods
that suppress overfitting may reduce the noise introduced
by training instances, but cannot completely remove their
unique influences, particularly the influences essential for
the model’s prediction power. On the other hand, noise
adding techniques based on the concept of differential pri-
vacy [11] can guarantee the low influence of each training
instance, while also reduces the prediction accuracy of
the model. How to capture the non-noise influences of
learning instances through the model’s output and how
to identify all the vulnerable instances with identifiable
influences on the model remain open questions.
Generalized MIA. These discoveries are made possi-
ble by a novel inference attack we call Generalized MIA
(GMIA). In GMIA, we propose a new technique for identi-
fying vulnerable records in a large dataset and new meth-
ods for detecting the small influence of these records that
are ignored by overfitting metrics and the prior attack.
Unlike overfitted models, whose answers (probabili-
ties) to the queries on the training instances differ signif-
icantly from those to other queries, a well-generalized
model behaves similarly on the training data and test data.
As a result, no longer can we utilize shadow models to
generate a meaningful training set for the attack model,
since most positive instances here (those inside shadow
models’ training sets) can be less distinguishable from the
negative instances (not in their training sets), in terms of
their classification probabilities. To address this challenge,
our approach focuses on detecting and analyzing vulner-
able target records (outliers) to infer their membership.
More specifically, GMIA first estimates whether a given
instance is an outlier with regards to the data accessible
to the adversary. This estimation is done by extracting
high-level feature vector from the intermediate outputs of
models trained on these data. We believe that an outlier
is more likely to be a vulnerable target record when it is
indeed inside the target model’s training set. Then we
train a set of reference models without the target record
in the training set, and use these models to build the dis-
tribution for the target record’s classification probabilities.
After that, we run a hypothesis test to decide whether its
classification by the target model is in line with this dis-
tribution. This approach successfully identifies training
records of well-generalized models. For example, on the
MNIST dataset, our attack achieves a precision of 93.36%
in 73.88% of the models (on the vulnerable objects) when
the cutoff p-value is 0.01.
It is even more challenging to attack a target record
without directly querying it (an indirect inference), which
has never been done before. To find the right queries for
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the object, GMIA trains two sets of reference models:
those include the object (positive reference models) and
those do not (reference models). These two sets of models
are used to filter out random queries, finding those whose
probabilities for receiving the object’s class labels are
almost always higher with the positive reference models
than with the reference models. The selected queries are
run against the target model, and their results (classifi-
cation probabilities) are compared with their individual
distributions built from the reference models through a set
of hypothesis tests. Finally, the test results (p-value) of
individual queries are combined using Kost’s method [23]
to determine the object’s presence in the target model’s
training set. On the Adult dataset, with a cut-off p-value
of 0.01, this indirect attack inferred the presence of a
record with a precision of 100% in 16% of the models
when a direct attack failed to infer any of them.
Contributions. The contributions of the paper are sum-
marized as follows:
• New understanding about generalization and privacy.
We revisit the membership inference problem and find that
overfitting is not a necessary condition for information
leaks: even a well-generalized model still cannot prevent
MIA, whenever some of its training instances have unique
impacts on the learning model. This discovery reveals
the fundamental challenges in protecting data privacy
for machine learning models and can potentially inspire
follow-up research on mitigating this risk.
• New techniques for membership inference attacks. We
present new techniques for membership inferences on a
well-generalized model. Our approach addresses the chal-
lenges of finding vulnerable target records, identifying
their small influences on the target model, and attack-
ing the target model without directly querying the target
records.
• Implementation and evaluation. We implement our
attacks and evaluate them against real-world datasets. Our
studies demonstrate their effectiveness and also highlight
the challenges in protecting machine learning models
against such threats.
2 Background
2.1 Membership Inference Attacks
In a membership inference attack, the adversary’s goal
is to infer the membership status of a target individuals
data in the input dataset to some computation. For a
survey, the adversary wishes to ascertain, from aggregate
survey responses, whether the individual participated in
the survey. For machine learning, the adversary wishes
to ascertain whether the target’s record was part of the
dataset used to train a specific model.
One of the first prominent examples of membership in-
ference attacks occur in the context of Genome-Wide As-
sociation Studies (GWAS). The seminal work of Homer et
al. [18] show that p-values, a type of aggregated statistics
routinely published when reporting the results of studies,
could be used to successfully infer membership status.
Although this attack requires that the adversary know the
genome of the target individual, it teaches an important
lesson: seemly harmless aggregate statistics may contain
sufficient information for successful membership infer-
ences. As a consequence of this attack, NIH has removed
all aggregate data of GWAS from public websites [40].
More recently, it was shown that membership infer-
ence attacks can occur in the context of machine learn-
ing. Shokri et al. [32] demonstrated that an adversary
with only black-box access to a classifier could success-
fully infer membership status. However, their attack only
works when the classifier is highly overfitted to its training
dataset.
2.2 Model Generalization
A desirable property of any model is having low gener-
alization error. Informally, this means the model should
have good performance on unseen examples. More pre-
cisely, we adopt the approach of [7] which defines gen-
eralization error as the expected model error with the
expectation taken over a random example from the popu-
lation.
In practice, one does not have access to the population
but only to samples from it. Thus, we must estimate
the generalization error empirically. To do this, we can
simply measure the generalization error with respect to a
hold out set instead of the population. Informally, a good
indication of low generalization error is if the model’s
performance is (almost) the same on the training and
testing datasets.
2.3 Adversary Model
We consider an adversary mounting a membership in-
ference attack against an already trained machine learning
model, in which the adversary attempts to infer if a target
record r is used as a training record for the target model
M. We assume that the adversary has black-box access to
the target model, i.e., he can issue arbitrary queries and
retrieve the answers (e.g., the probability vector) from the
model; the number of queries, however, may be limited.
Similar as the previous work [32], we further assume that
the adversary either (1) knows the structure of the target
model (e.g., the depth and the number of neurons each
layer of the neural network) and the training algorithm
used to build the model, or (2) has black-box access to
the machine learning algorithm used to train the model.
We also assume that the adversary has some prior knowl-
edge about the population from which the training records
are drawn. Specifically, the adversary can access a set
of records that are drawn independently from that pop-
ulation, which may or may not overlap with the actual
training data for the target models; but the adversary does
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(a) The toy example dataset. The dataset
is composed records with real-valued
features (x-axis and y-axis) and a binary
label (+ or −) used for classification.
(b) Influence on the probability density
function (f(x)) of the model’s prediction.
The in and out distributions do not
fully overlap, which allows the adver-
sary to distinguish them.
(c) Estimation of PrinProut based on the
model’s predictions for two queries
(query 1 on x-axis and query 2 on y-
axis). When prediction for both queries
are above 0.4, it is significantly more
likely than not that the record was part
of the training data.
Figure 1: Understanding the unique influence of a record through a toy example dataset (a). The adversary performs MIA by fingerprinting the target
record’s influence on the model’s outputs (predicted class probabilities). There are two competing hypotheses: (1) Hin: record is part of the training
data, and (2) Hout: record is not part of the training data. The adversary infers membership status by estimating which hypothesis is more likely based
on the model’s outputs.
not have any additional information about whether these
records are present in the training data. These records
can often be obtained from public dataset with similar
attributes or from previous data breaches.
3 Understanding Membership Inference
Attacks
Previous work demonstrates the vulnerability of ma-
chine learning (ML) models to membership inference
attacks (MIAs), but little was known about its root cause.
We revisit this based on the new results presented in this
paper, in an attempt to understand the source of infor-
mation leaks in machine learning models that can be ex-
ploited by MIAs.
3.1 Overfitting and Vulnerability of Ma-
chine Learning Models
Shokri et al. [32] show that overfitting is a sufficient
condition for MIA. But is overfitting necessary for mem-
bership inference? This question is crucial yet not an-
swered by prior work. If overfitting is a prerequisite
for successful MIA then attacks can be mitigated using
techniques to enforce generalization (e.g., model regular-
ization).
Our research leads to the new observations that MIAs
can still succeed even when the target model is well gen-
eralized. For example, using the MNIST set, we find
16 records (out of 20,000) whose membership can be in-
ferred successfully with greater than 90% precision in
74% of the models. Moreover, we find that, while model
regularization improves the generalization, it does not
reliably eliminate the threat. For instance, using an image
dataset, after applying L2 regularization with a coefficient
of 0.01, the membership status of one image can still be
inferred with 100% precision in 34% of the models.
3.2 Influence and Uniqueness
What causes models to leak membership information?
Our research uncovers a new way of thinking about this
question in terms of the unique influence of vulnerable
records on the model. Informally, a record has a unique
influence if there exists a set of queries for which the
model outputs can reliably reveal the record’s presence in
the training data. In such a case, the adversary effectively
infers the membership of a target record by the fingerprint
of the record, i.e., the model outputs to queries of the
target record and relevant records when the target record
is included in the training set of the target model.
To explain why the unique influence of a target record
is the key for a successful MIA, we consider an adversary
attempting to determine the membership status of a target
record r through black-box access to a target model M,
using hypothesis testing between two hypotheses:
(Hin) r is in the training set of M
(Hout) r is not in the training set of M
By querying the model M, the adversary gathers evidence
in favor of either Hin or Hout, eventually deciding in the
favor of the more likely hypothesis.
To illustrate this approach, we use a toy dataset with
1,181 records (as shown in Figure 1a) to train a neural
network model with two fully connected layers for binary
classification. Suppose we want to infer the membership
of a record r by querying a record q. Let M(q) be the
models output to q. Over the record space from which the
training records are sampled, we derive two probability
distributions of the output of q on the two different sets
of models, respectively: 1) the models trained with r, and
2) the models trained without r. Specifically, as shown in
Figure 1b, the probability density functions (pdfs) of the
model outputs (i.e., the output probability of the positive
class) under the hypotheses Hin and Hout, respectively, do
not fully overlap, indicating an adversary can decide in
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favor of Hin if the output probability of the positive class
is above a threshold (e.g., 0.15).
The key to this strategy is that the two distributions are
distinguishable. This happens because for a significant
number of models, the outputs on q are consistently dif-
ferent when r is or is not included in the training data.
In other words, r has a unique influence on models with
respect to the record q. In practice, an adversary can only
approximate these two distributions; but, as we show in
this paper, it is feasible to identify vulnerable records, i.e.,
those with unique influences on the models. For example,
for the MNIST dataset, we can efficiently infer the pres-
ence of 16 vulnerable images in the training dataset with
precisions greater than 90% in 73.88% of the time.
We stress that what matters here is not the strength of
the influence of records, but the influence being unique
with respect to other records in the training set and in the
record space. The attack fails if there are other records
in the record space that would show a similar influence
on the model as r if some of them were included in the
training set. In such a case, r does not have a unique
influence to the model, and the two distributions largely
overlap.
3.3 Types of Influences
Our work here also demonstrates distinguishing be-
tween different kinds of influences that a record may have
on the model, which lead to different mechanisms of MIA.
Intuitively, we expect that strongest influence of a record
is on the model’s output for the query of this specific
record. In fact, this is precisely consistent with our exper-
imental observationsHowever, inclusion of a target record
in the training set may influence the model’s output behav-
ior on the queries of other records, which may or may not
be strongly correlated with the target record with respect
to their features. Surprisingly, in our experiments, we ob-
serve that the attacks leveraging these indirect influences
(i.e., the indirect inferences) are sometimes more effec-
tive than those based on the direct influences the target
records. Specifically, in the Adult dataset, we identify
a record whose presence can be inferred by the indirect
inference with 100% precision in 14% of the models,
whereas the direct inference failed to infer the record’s
precense in any of the models.
The indirect inferences are powerful because they al-
low an adversary to accumulate evidence from multiple
queries. The more queries the adversary submits, the
more likely an adversary can gather the unique influences
of the target record, and thus the easier it is to discern
the two distributions under different hypotheses as de-
scribed above. Figure 1c illustrates this concept through
a heatmap of the likelihood ratio under the hypotheses of
Hin and Hout.
Figure 2: Attack Overview
4 Generalized Membership Inference At-
tack
In this section, we present the major components of the
generalized MIA (GMIA) framework: reference model
generation, vulnerable records selection, and the inference
attacks. The latter includes the direct inference which
queries the target record and the indirect inference which
queries selected non-target records.
4.1 Attack Overview
Figure 2 shows the attack components in their logical
sequence. Below, we briefly describe the methods in-
volved in each component and the motivation. We present
the details in the follow-up sections.
Building Reference Models. We build reference ma-
chine learning (ML) models to imitate the prediction
behaviors of the target model, using reference records
accessible to the adversary that represent the space where
the actual training data are sampled. As the number of
available reference records may be limited, we adopt
bootstrap sampling [12] to construct training dataset for
building multiple reference models. Once constructed, the
reference models are exploited in each steps of the GMIA
framework, including target record selection, query selec-
tion, and hypothesis testing.
Selecting Vulnerable Target Records. In well-
generalized models, not all training records are vulnerable
to MIA. Therefore, identifying vulnerable target records
is the key to an effective attack. We develop a method for
selecting vulnerable records by estimating the number of
neighbors they have in the the sample space represented
by the reference dataset. Records with fewer neighbors
are more vulnerable under MIA because they are more
likely to impose unique influence on the machine learning
models. In order to identify neighbors of a given record,
we construct a new feature vector for each record based
on the intermediate outputs of reference models on this
record, which implies this record’s influence on the target
machine learning model.
Direct Inference by Querying the Target Record. A
training record usually influences the model’s predictions
on itself. However, in well-generalized models, this in-
fluence is usually small and hard to detect. In a direct
inference, we attack a machine learning model by sub-
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Figure 3: Last layer output of a two-layer neural network
mitting a query of the target record. We use a hypothesis
test to determine whether the target model’s prediction
is deviated from the predictions of reference models for
that the target records are not used in the training. The
p-value from the hypothesis test indicates the confidence
of the attack and thus allows the adversary to efficiently
estimate the performance of the attack.
Indirect Inference without Querying the Target
Record . We observe that a training record influences
a model’s predictions not only on itself but also on other
seemingly uncorrelated records (called enhancing records
in GMIA). In GMIA, we use novel techniques that it-
eratively search for and select enhancing records. Our
indirect inferences using the enhancing records can suc-
cessfully infer the presence of a target record without
querying it. Moreover, the indirect inferences sometimes
outperform direct inferences by accumulating more infor-
mation from multiple queries.
4.2 Building Reference Models
GMIA exploits a target record’s unique influence on the
outputs of a machine learning model to infer the presence
of the record in the training set of the target model (called
target training set). To identify such influence, we need
to estimate the model’s behavior when the target record
is not in the target training set. To achieve this goal, we
build reference models, which are trained using the same
algorithm on reference datasets sampled from the same
space as the target training set, but not containing the
target record. The process of building reference models
are illustrated below.
To start with, we need to construct k reference datasets
with the same size as the target training set. Since most
practical machine learning models are trained on large
training datasets, it is difficult for an adversary to get
access to an even larger dataset with k times records as the
target training set. Consequently, if we build the reference
datasets by sampling without replacement from the whole
set of reference records, the resulting datasets may share
many records, and the reference models built from them
would be alike and give similar outputs. To address this
issue, we use bootstrap sampling [12] to generate the
Figure 4: Generate new features for vulnerable record selection
reference datasets, where each dataset is sampled with
replacement. Bootstrap sampling reduces overlaps among
reference datasets, providing a better approximation of
datasets sampled from distribution of the target training
set. Each reference dataset is then used to train a reference
model using the same training algorithms as used for
training the target model.
4.3 Selecting Vulnerable Records
Not all training records are vulnerable to MIA. In an
extreme case, if two records are nearly identical, it is dif-
ficult to discern which one of them is indeed present in
the training dataset because their influence on the model
is indistinguishable. In general, we want to measure the
potential influence of a target record so as to select vul-
nerable records with the greatest influences and subject
them to MIA in the subsequent steps. It is worth noting
that, although the the training records imposing unique
influence on the model are often outlier records (i.e., with
distinct feature vectors) in the training set, the outlier
records do not always have unique influence on the model
because the training algorithm may decide that some fea-
tures should be given higher weights than others and some
features should be combined in the model. For example,
a neural network trained on hand written digit datasets
learns the contour of written digits is more important fea-
ture than individual pixels [25]. Therefore, instead of
using the input features, we extract high level features
more relevant to the classification task to detect vulnerable
records.
Specifically, when attacking neural networks (e.g., see
Figure 3 for a two-layer fully connected neural network),
we construct new feature vectors by concatenating the
outputs of the last layer before the Softmax function from
the reference models (Figure 4), as the deeper layers in
the network are more correlated with the classification
output [16]. We then measure the unique influences of
each record using its new feature vector. Let f be the the
new feature vector of the record r. We call two records r1
and r2 neighbors if the cosine distance between their fea-
ture vectors f1 and f2 is smaller than a neighbor-threshold
δ .
Note that the neighboring records are difficult to be
distinguished by MIA because they have similar influence
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on the model. When a neighbor of r occurs in the training
dataset, the model may behave as if r is used to train
the model, leading to the incorrect membership inference
result. Our goal is to select the vulnerable records in
the entire record space with fewer or no neighbors likely
to be present in the training set (assuming the training
records are independently drawn from the record space)
as putative targets of MIA.
Given a training dataset with N records and a reference
dataset with N′ records, both sampled from the same
record space, and a target record r, we count the number
of neighbors of r in the reference dataset, denoted as
N′n. Then, the expected number of neighbors of r in the
training dataset, Nn, can be estimated as E [Nn] =N′n× N
′
N .
A record r is considered to be potentially vulnerable
(and as the attack object), only if E [Nn]< β , where β is
the probability-threshold for target record selection. We
stress that the approach for vulnerable records selection
presented here relies only on the record space (represented
by the reference records accessible by an adversary) and
the reference models (built using reference records), and
is independent of the target model; as a result, the com-
putation can be done off-line even when used to attack a
machine learning as a service (MLaaS).
4.4 Direct Inference by Querying the Tar-
get Record
In well-generalized models, a single record’s influence
on the model’s prediction is usually small and hard to de-
tect. Moreover, the extent of this influence varies between
records, so the approach in the prior MIA [32] no longer
works. Instead, we attack each target record separately by
computing the deviation between its output given by the
target model and those given by the reference models. We
expect that each training record has a unique influence
on the model, which can be measured by comparing the
target model’s output with the output of reference mod-
els (trained without the target record) on the record. We
quantify the difference between the outputs using the log
loss function. Given a classifier M and a record r with
class label yr, let pyr be M’s output probability of class
label yr. The log loss function [30]L (M,r) is defined as:
L (M,r) =− log pyr . The log loss function is commonly
used as a criterion function [30] when training neural
network models. L (M,r) is small when M gives high
probabilities on correct labels.
Given a target model M, a target record r, and k refer-
ence models, we first obtain the log loss of all the refer-
ence models on r as L1,L2, . . . ,Lk. We view these losses
as samples independently drawn from a distributionD(L),
and estimate the empirical cumulative distribution func-
tion (CDF) of DL as F(L), which takes a real-valued loss
L as input. We use the shape-preserving piecewise cubic
interpolation [34] to smooth the estimated CDF. Based on
Figure 5: Steps for generating enhancing records.
the log loss of the target model M on the target record r,
L (M,r), we estimate the confidence of r to be present
in the training set by performing a left-tailed hypothesis
test: under the null hypothesis H0, r is not present in
the training set (i.e., L (M,r) is randomly drawn from
D(L)), while under the alternative hypothesis r is used
to train M (i.e.,L (M,r) is smaller than samples in D(L)
because of the influence of r in the training). Therefore,
we calculate the p-value as: p = F (L (M,r)) , which
gives the confidence that r is used for training M only if
p is smaller than a threshold (e.g. 0.01) so that the null
hypothesis is rejected.
4.5 Indirect Inference without Querying
the Target Record
Besides reducing a model’s loss on its own, a train-
ing record also influences the model’s outputs on other
records. This influence is desirable to improve model gen-
eralization: in order to give correct predictions on unseen
records, a model needs to use the correlation it learns from
a training record to make predictions on queries with sim-
ilar features. On the other hand, however, these influences
can be exploited by an adversary to obtain more informa-
tion about the target record through multiple queries to
enhance MIA. Interestingly, we show that MIA can be
achieved by queries of records seemingly uncorrelated
with the target record, making the attack hard to detect.
The key challenge for inference without querying
the target record is to efficiently identify the enhancing
records whose outputs from the target model are expected
to be influenced by the target record. To address this
problem, we develop a method consisting of the follow-
ing steps: random record generation, record clustering,
enhancing record selection, and enhancing records opti-
mization (as shown in Figure 5).
Random Record Generation. To start with, we ran-
domly generate records from which the enhancing records
are selected. Specifically, we adopt one of the following
two methods for random record generation: (1) when the
feature space is relatively small, we uniformly sample
records from the whole feature space; (2) when the fea-
ture space is large, since the chance of getting enhancing
records by uniform sampling is slim, we generate ran-
dom records by adding Gaussian noise to pre-selected
vulnerable target records.
Enhancing Record Selection. To identify records whose
target model’s output may be influenced by the target
record r, we approximate the target model’s behavior us-
ing a group of positive reference models that are trained
using reference records plus the target record r. To save
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Figure 6: Building positive reference models by updating the model
with the training set including the reference records plus the target
record.
the effort of retraining the positive reference models, we
add the target record into batches sampled from the origi-
nal reference dataset and update the reference models by
training on the batches plus the target record. Figure 6
shows the process of updating reference models.
We select the enhancing records by comparing the
predictions between the positive reference models (i.e.,
“in models”) and the original reference models (that are
trained without the target records, i.e., “out models”). We
denote the ith original and the ith positive reference model
as Mrefi and M
r
refi , respectively. Given a record r with class
label yr and another arbitrary record q, let M (q,yr) be the
model M’s output probability of yr on the query q. We
calculate r’s influence on q as follows:
I (r,q) =
1
k
k
∑
i=1
t
(
Mrrefi (q,yr)−Mrefi (q,yr)
)
, (1)
where k is the total number of original (or positive) ref-
erence models, and t is a threshold function defined as
follows:
t(x) =
{
1 if x > 0,
0 otherwise.
Algorithm 1 Enhancing Records Selection Algorithm
1: procedure selectθ (q) . Input a random query
2: I (r,q)← ∑ki=1 t
(
Mrrefi (q,yr)−Mrefi (q,yr)
)/
k
3: if I > θ then
4: Accept q . Use q in MIA
5: else
6: Reject q
We identify a randomly generated record q is an en-
hancing record for the record r if I(r,q) approaches 1,
which indicates that adding r to the training dataset al-
most always increase the models’ output probability on
the class label yr for the query q. In practice, we use q
in the MIA on the target record r only if I(r,q) is greater
than a threshold θ (e.g. 0.95). Algorithm 1 summarizes
the entire algorithm for query selection.
Enhancing Record Optimization. When the target
model has a large record space (e.g., with high-dimension
feature vectors), the chance of finding an enhancing
Figure 7: Generate query features for query selection.
record among randomly generated records is slim. To
address this issue, we propose an algorithm to search for
enhancing records for a target record r by optimizing the
following objective function:
max
q
I (r,q) , (2)
where I (r,q) is the influence function defined in Equa-
tion 1. Optimizing I (r,q) is time-consuming because
I (r,q) consists of a non-differentiable threshold function
t. Therefore, instead of solving the optimization func-
tion in equation 2, For simplification, we approximate the
maximization of I (r,q) with the minimization of the sum
of multiple hinge loss functions defined as follows [15]:
min
q
k
∑
i=1
max
(
0,γ− (Mrrefi (q,yr)−Mrefi (q,yr))) , (3)
where γ is a parameter indicating the margin width. If
a randomly generated record are rejected by the query
selection algorithm, we minimize the objective function
in Equation 3 using gradient descent [9] to check if the
resulting record is acceptable as an enhancing record.
Record Clustering (Optional). Note that it is inefficient
to repeat the query selection and optimization algorithms
on all random records because the predictions of the
models on most records are highly correlated: the mod-
els giving high output probabilities on some record are
also likely to give high output probabilities on correlated
records. To improve the efficiency of query selection,
we propose an algorithm to identify the least correlated
enhancing records from a large number of randomly gen-
erated records.
First, we estimate the correlation between records
based on the model’s predictions on them. We construct
a feature vector fq for a record q by concatenating the ref-
erence models’ outputs on it (Figure 7). If two queries q1
and q2 have highly correlated feature vectors, the models’
outputs on q2 do not add much information to the models’
outputs on q1.
Next, we formulate the problem of selecting a subset
of least correlated records as a graph theoretical problem.
We build a graph where records are the nodes and pair-
wise correlation between records is the weight on edges
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connecting the corresponding nodes. This allows us to re-
cast our problem as the k-lightest subgraph problem [37],
which is NP-hard. We obtain an approximate solution
using hierarchical clustering [20]. For this, we cluster the
records into k disjoint clusters based on their pairwise co-
sine distance. Finally, in each cluster, we select the record
with least average cosine distance to all other records in
the same cluster.
As shown in Figure 5, we use the enhancing record
clustering algorithm before the enhancing record selection
and enhancing record optimization steps to improve the
efficiency of the attack.
Indirect Inference with Multiple Queries. After identi-
fying multiple enhancing records, we repeat the attack in
section 4.4 by querying each of these records. Because
the outputs on these queries may be correlated, we com-
bine the resulting p-values using Kost’s method [23], with
the covariance matrix estimated from the query features
generated in the query selection step (Figure 7).
5 Evaluation
5.1 Experimental Setup
We evaluated two aspects of the performance of our
attack: (1) How many target records are considered to
be vulnerable according to the GMIA selection criterion?
and (2) How likely are vulnerable records to be inferred
by GMIA when they are in the training dataset?
To answer the first question, we ran the GMIA vul-
nerable record selection algorithm over all the target
records. We compared the number of selected vulner-
able records across different datasets, varying neighbor
threshold δ , and probability threshold β . We evaluated
the performance of GMIA over the selected vulnerable
target records instead of the whole dataset since, in real
attacks, adversary is likely to choose a few vulnerable
targets instead of attacking all individuals.
To answer the second question, we evaluated the perfor-
mance of the attack over multiple models. We constructed
100 target models, half of which are trained with the tar-
get record. To guarantee that each target record occurred
in exactly 50 out of 100 target models, we generated train-
ing datasets by randomly splitting the target records into
two datasets of the same size, each serving as a training
set for a target model. We repeated this process for 50
times and generated the training datasets for 100 target
models.
For each vulnerable target record, we performed GMIA
on all the target models, and calculated for what percent-
age of models it can be correctly identified. When there
are multiple vulnerable target records, we repeated the
attack on every vulnerable target record over all the tar-
get models. An inference takes place only if the adver-
sary has high confidence in the success of the attack (e.g.
p < 0.01). The precision of the attack is defined as the
percentage of successful inferences (i.e., the target record
is indeed in the training dataset) among all inferences.
The recall of the attack is defined as the percentage of
successful inferences among all the cases that the target
record is in the training set (i.e. 50n). It indicates the like-
lihood that the membership of a vulnerable target record
can be inferred. We define true positive (TP) to be the
case that the target record is indeed in the training dataset
when the adversary inferred it as in and false positive (FP)
to be the case that the target record is not in the training
dataset when the adversary inferred it as in.
5.2 Dataset
UCI Adult. The UCI Adult dataset [26] is a census
dataset containing 48,842 records and 14 attributes. The
attributes are demographic features and the classification
task is to predict whether an individual’s salary is above
$50K a year. We normalized the numerical attributes
in the dataset and used one hop encoding [38] to con-
struct the binary representation of categorical features.
We randomly selected 20,000 records for training target
models, and each training dataset contains 10,000 records.
The remaining 28,842 records served as the adversary’s
background knowledge.
UCI Cancer. The UCI cancer dataset [26] contains 699
records and 10 numerical features ranging between 1 to
10. The features are characteristics of the cell in an image
of a fine needle aspirate (FNA) of a breast mass. The
classification task is to determine whether the cell is ma-
lignant or benign. We randomly selected 200 records for
training, and each training dataset contains 100 records.
The remaining 499 records served as the adversary’s back-
ground knowledge.
MNIST Dataset. The MNIST dataset [24] is an image
dataset of handwritten digits. The classification task is
to predict which digit is represented in an image. We
randomly selected 20,000 images for training and 40,000
images as the adversary’s background knowledge. Each
training set for target models and reference models con-
tains 10,000 images.
5.3 Models
Neural Network. For the Adult dataset, we constructed
a fully connected neural network with 2 hidden layers
with 10 units and 5 units respectively. We use Tanh
as the activation function and SoftMax as the output
layer. The model is trained with batchsize of 100 and
20,000 epochs. For the MNIST dataset, we constructed
2 convolutional layers with ReLu as the activation func-
tion, followed with max pooling layers. We then added
a fully connected layer of 1,024 neurons, and we also
used dropout techniques to reduce overfitting. Finally, we
added an output layer and a Softmax layer. The model is
trained with batchsize of 50 and 10,000 epochs. For the
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Table 1: GMIA by Direct Inference
p-value precision recall TP FP
Adult
(13 records)
0.001 - 0 0 0
0.002 1 0.31% 2 0
0.01 73.91% 5.23% 34 12
Cancer
(5 records)
0.001 - 0 0 0
0.008 1 2.4% 6 0
0.01 88.89% 3.2% 8 1
MNIST
(16 records)
0.0001 1 24.37% 195 0
0.001 96.55% 45.50% 364 13
0.01 93.36% 73.88% 591 42
Adult(Google)
(7 records)
0.001 - 0 0 0
0.009 1 2.33% 7 0
0.01 80% 2.67% 8 2
MNIST(Google)
(1 record)
0.001 - 0 0 0
0.01 1 4% 2 0
0.014 1 8% 4 0
Cancer dataset, we used a vanilla neural network with no
hidden layer. The model is trained with batchsize of 10
and 3,000 epochs.
Google ML Engine. Since the Google Predictions
API [2] used in the prior attack is deprecated, we used
Google ML Engine [1] to train target models on ML cloud.
When training the model, we used the samples provided
by Google, which has pre-built model structures for train-
ing models on Adult dataset and MNIST dataset. Specif-
ically, for Adult dataset, the sample code uses Google
estimator [3] which hides low-level model structure from
the user; for MNIST dataset, the sample code builds a
neural network with 2 fully-connected hidden layers.
5.4 Direct Inference
In our first attack, we inferred the membership of vul-
nerable target records from the target models’ predictions
on these records. Based on the vulnerable target record se-
lection algorithm in Section 4, using a probability thresh-
old β = 0.1 (i.e. the likelihood that a target record’s
neighbor occurs in the training dataset of the target model
is smaller than 0.1) , we selected 13 (out of 20,000) tar-
get records in the Adult dataset, 5 (out of 200) target
records in the Cancer dataset, and 16 (out of 20,000) tar-
get records in the MNIST dataset. The neighborhood
threshold δ used for these three datasets are 0.4, 0.1, and
0.2 respectively. We discuss the influence of these param-
eters in Section 5.5. For models trained on Google ML
engine, we selected 7 (out of 20,000) target records for
Adult(Google) and 1 target record for MNIST(Google).
We performed GMIA on each of the selected target record
and on all 100 target models.
Figure 8 shows the precision-recall curve of GMIA
by querying the target record. Table 1 reflects the attack
performance under different cut-off p-values. The recall
reflects the likelihood that the membership of selected
target records will be identified. When using 0.01 cut-
off threshold for p-values, an adversary can attack with
73.91% precision on the Adult dataset, 88.89% precision
on the Cancer dataset, and 93.36% precision on MNIST.
All the target models we successfully attacked are well-
generalized with difference between training and testing
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Figure 8: GMIA by Direct Inference
accuracy below 0.01(Table 6 in the Appendix). In com-
parison, the prior MIA [32] has low precision (< 70%)
on the same models and the same target records as shown
in Table 7 in the Appendix.
Our attack had better performance on the local MNIST
model compared to the Google ML ones because the CNN
we constructed locally was more complex. Note that
our local CNN improved upon the model on Google ML
engine in testing accuracy by 8%, indicating an increase
in model utility. However, the privacy risk also increased
significantly. When p < 0.01, the attack recall increased
by more than 70%. This result indicates the high privacy
risk of applying complex models even when these models
are not overfitted.
Our vulnerable record selection mechanism was less
effective on the Adult Google ML model since we did
not have access to the exact model structure due to the
use of Google estimator. Instead, we used raw features to
select target records. This limitation reduced the number
of vulnerable target records we identified from 13 to 7.
5.5 Influence of Vulnerable Target Record
Selection
Before launching the attack, we selected vulnerable tar-
get records by finding out records with unique high level
feature vectors. This selection process helps reducing
the incorrect inference caused by similar records in the
training dataset. The selection criterion depends on two
parameters: the neighbor threshold δ , which determines
the criterion of neighbors, and the probability threshold
β , which indicates how likely a neighbor is to occur in
the training dataset. We studied selected vulnerable target
records under different thresholds. Table 2 and Figure 9
shows performance of GIA w.r.t. varying target record
selection threshold. Smaller neighbor thresholds or higher
probability thresholds increased the number of selected
vulnerable target records. However, as we tried to attack
more records at the same time, there was a higher chance
that we would make false positive inferences due to the
influence of a record similar to one of the target records,
which decreased the attack precision. Moreover, the recall
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Figure 9: Effect of different target selection threshold on attack performances
Table 2: GMIA w.r.t. Target Record Selection (p = 0.01)
δ β # of Targets precision recall
Adult
0.4 0.1 13 73.91% 5.23%
0.4 0.5 26 68% 3.92%
0.3 0.1 53 65.81% 2.91%
0.2 0.1 127 66.21% 2.19%
Cancer
0.1 0.1 5 88.89% 3.2%
0.1 1 21 68.75% 3.14%
0.05 0.1 33 66.67% 2.6%
MNIST
0.2 0.1 16 93.36% 73.88%
0.2 1 27 95.05% 66.89%
0.2 2 52 90.84% 68.31%
of the attack also decreased since we included records
with weaker influence on the model as vulnerable target
records.
5.6 Indirect Inference
For some vulnerable target records, we achieved the
same level of attack performance by querying enhanc-
ing records. For each dataset, we randomly sampled
5,000 records, selected 50 of them by record cluster-
ing, and tested them with the enhancing record selection
algorithm [6]. If less than 10 enhancing records were
selected, we ran the enhancing record optimization al-
gorithm to improve the records. The initial records for
the Cancer dataset and the Adult dataset were randomly
sampled from the feature space while the records for the
MNIST dataset were generated by adding noise to the
target records due to the large feature space.
We selected 1 target record in each dataset. For the
Cancer dataset, we selected 47 enhancing records whose
euclidean distance to the target record range between 6
and 19.3 with a selection criterion I (r,q)> 0.95. Since
the Cancer dataset has relatively low dimensional features,
enough enhancing records were accepted, and enhancing
record optimization was not needed. For the Adult dataset,
we relaxed the enhancing record selection criterion to
I (r,q) > 0.9 and found 15 enhancing records after the
optimization step. For the MNIST dataset, we further
relaxed the enhancing record criterion to I (r,q)> 0.8 due
to the high dimensional feature space. We identified 41
enhancing records generated by adding noise to the target
record.
Table 3 and Figure 10 show the performance of indirect
inferences. For both the Cancer dataset and the Adult
dataset, attacking with the enhancing records has compat-
ible performance as querying the target record. Moreover,
for the Adult dataset, querying the target record did not
Table 3: Comparison between Direct and Indirect Inferences
Dataset p-value prec.(direct)
recall
(direct)
prec.
(indirect)
recall
(indirect)
Adult 0.01 - 0 1 14%
0.1 70.83% 34% 75% 24%
Cancer 0.01 1 6% - 0
0.1 66.67% 52% 88.89% 16%
MNIST 0.01 96.15% 1 1 2%
0.1 89.29% 1 52.38% 22%
successfully infer any cases with a 0.01 cut-off p-value,
but by combining the predictions on enhancing records,
we achieved a precision of 1 and a recall of 14%. For the
MNIST dataset, we achieved a precision of 1 and a recall
of 2% when p≤ 0.01. Although this performance is less
impressive compared to a direct inference on the same
record (whose precision and recall are both close to 1) it’s
still an indication that membership inference attack can
succeed without querying the target record. Moreover, we
plotted both the target record and the enhancing records
and found that the enhancing records in no means rep-
resent the target record, indicating that GMIA is hard to
detect (Figure 13 in the Appendix).
5.7 Influence of Training Epochs
In machine learning, one way of preventing overfitting
is to stop training the model as soon as the testing accu-
racy stops increasing [8]. This method is called “early
stop”. To study the influence of maximum training epochs
on GMIA, we trained neural networks on MNIST dataset
with 1k maximum training epochs. Unlike “early stop”
method, which stops the training process after testing
accuracy stops increasing, we stopped training the mod-
els before the testing accuracy stopped increasing and
performed the attack on potentially underfitted models.
Table 4 shows the training and testing accuracy of the
models
Table 4: GMIA w.r.t. Training Epochs (p = 0.01)
Training
Epoch
Training
Acc.
Test
Acc. δ β
# of
Targets prec. recall
1,000 0.97 0.96 0.2 0.1 28 72.27% 6.14%0.3 0.1 4 1 2.5%
10,000 0.99 0.98 0.2 0.1 16 93.36% 73.88%
Figure 11a shows the GMIA performance on models
trained with 1k epochs and 10k epochs respectively. Re-
ducing the training epoch did not eliminate membership
privacy risk because a few records in the dataset were
still identified with high precision. Specifically, when
we increased the neighborhood threshold δ from 0.2 to
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Figure 10: Attack without Querying the Target Record
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Figure 11: Influence of training epochs and regularization
0.3, the 4 vulnerable target records were identified with a
precision of 1 and a recall of 2.5%.
Moreover, as we increased the maximum training
epoch, the model’s testing accuracy increased, indicat-
ing an improvement in model generalization and model
utility. However, this small improvement in model utility
came at a huge cost for privacy—it increased the attack
precision from 72.27% to 93.36% and recall from 6.14%
to 73.88%.
5.8 Influence of Regularization
Regularization is a common method for improving
model generalization. It is shown to be an effective de-
fense against the prior MIA [32]. To study its effective-
ness on GMIA, we applied L2 regularization on neural
networks trained on MNIST set even though the models
were not overfitted. In doing so, we limited the model
capacity which increased the risk of underfitting. Specif-
ically, when the regularization coefficient λ went from
0.001 to 0.01, testing accuracy decreased by 0.01 indi-
cating that the model might be underfitted due to over
regularization.
Table 5 and Figure 11b shows the model accuracy and
GMIA performance before and after applying L2 regular-
ization with varying coefficients λ . Applying regulariza-
tion reduced the number of vulnerable target records in
the dataset, but did not completely eliminate the privacy
risk. The remaining vulnerable records were attacked
with high precision. Specifically, when L2 regularization
was applied with coefficient λ = 0.01, we still identi-
fied 1 vulnerable target record, which was inferred with
precision close to 1 and a recall of 4%.
Like reducing training epoch, applying regularization
mitigated the model’s privacy risk but did not eliminate
Table 5: GMIA w.r.t. Regularization (δ = 0.2, β = 2, p = 0.01)
Regularization
Coefficient λ
Training
Acc.
Test
Acc.
# of
Targets prec. recall
0 0.99 0.98 52 90.84% 68.31%
0.001 0.99 0.99 1 1 54.8%
0.01 0.98 0.98 1 93.36% 4%
the risk. Moreover, since the most vulnerable record was
identified with high precision, regularization may not be
a good approach when the data owner wants to provide
privacy protection for all individuals whose records are
in the dataset.
6 Discussion
6.1 Understanding GMIA
Intuitions. As mentioned in Section 3, MIA can succeed
by querying a record q if the target record has a unique
influence on the predictions on q. Specifically, when we
attack by querying the target record, the target record r is
vulnerable to MIA when there is a non-overlapping area
between the two distributions: the distribution of predic-
tions on r when r is not used to train the model and the
distribution of predictions on r when r is used. To verify
our understanding, we plot the distribution of predictions
on a vulnerable record r∗ (Figure 13 in the Appendix) in
the MNIST dataset. Firgure 14 in the Appendix shows
this distribution. In section 5, the membership of r∗ is
inferred with a precision of 1 and a recall of 1 when di-
rectly querying r∗. This high vulnerability is explained
by the fact that there is almost no overlapping between
the distributions of predictions on r when r is included
and not included in the training dataset.
Limitations. In the meantime, our current design of
GMIA is preliminary. Our techniques for identifying
outliers cannot find all vulnerable instances: it is pos-
sible that some instances not considered to be outliers
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by our current design still exert unique influences on the
model, which need to be better understood in the follow-
up research. Moreover, the current way to search for the
for the enhancing records, through filtering out random
queries, is inefficient, and often does not produce any
results. More effective solutions could utilize a targeted
search based upon a better understanding about the rela-
tions between the target record and other records. Also in
line with the prior research [32], we assume the adversary
to either know the training algorithm or have black-box
access to the training algorithm as an oracle. In practice,
we may not be able to use the model identical to the target
to train our references. Our preliminary study shows that
it is still possible to attack some vulnerable instances in an
online target model (though at lower success rate) using
off-line models. How to make this more effective needs
further investigation. Fundamentally, it remains unclear
how much information about the training set is leaked out
through querying a machine learning model and whether
more sensitive techniques can be developed to capture
even a small signals for a record’s unique impact.
6.2 Mitigation
Generalization and perturbation. As mentioned earlier,
generalization has limited effect on mitigating GMIA: as
demonstrated in our study, even after applying the L2 reg-
ularization (with a coefficient of 0.01), still a vulnerable
record in MNIST dataset can be attacked with a preci-
sion of 1 (Section 5.8). In the meantime, adding noise
to the training set or to the model to achieve differential
privacy can suppress the information leak [11]. However,
in the presence of high-dimensional data, which is partic-
ularly vulnerable to our attack, perturbation significantly
undermines the utility of the model before its privacy
risk can be effectively controlled [21]. As an example, a
recent study reports that a differentially-private stochas-
tic gradient descent (SGD) only has an accuracy of 0.6
with ε = 1 and an accuracy of 0.5 with ε = 0.5 [29] on
the MNIST dataset. So we believe that a practical solu-
tion should apply generalization and perturbation together
with proper training set selection, detecting and removing
those vulnerable training instances.
Training record selection. We believe that there is a
fundamental contention between selecting useful train-
ing instances, which bring in additional information, and
suppressing their unique influence to protect their privacy.
An important step we could take here is to automatically
identify outliers and drop those not contributing much
to the utility of the model. To this end, new techniques
need to be developed to balance the risk mitigation and
the utility reduction for those risky instances. A machine
learning model could be built to automatically decide
whether an instance should be in the training set or not.
7 Related Work
Attacks on Machine Learning Models. Different at-
tacks against machine learning models have been pro-
posed in recent years. For example, reverse engineering
attacks [17, 36] steal model parameters and structures;
adversarial learning [13, 22, 27, 35] generates misleading
examples that will be misclassified by the model; model
inversion attacks [10, 14] infer the features of a record
based on the model’s predictions on it; membership in-
ference attacks [32] infer the presence of a record in the
model’s training dataset.
Privacy and Model Generalization. There is a connec-
tion between privacy and model generalization. Differ-
ential privacy can improve model generalization when
data is reused for validation [11]. Moreover, the prior
membership inference attack [32] achieves high accu-
racy on highly overfitted models while barely works on
non-overfitted ones. Previous research also points out
that privacy leakage can happen on non-overfitted mod-
els when the adversary has control over the training al-
gorithm. Specifically, the adversary can encode private
information of the training dataset into the predictions of
well-generalized models [33]. These two attacks [32, 33]
can be formalized under a uniform theoretical frame-
work [39]. The risk of membership inferences can be
empirically measured based on the influence of each train-
ing record [28].
Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning Differential pri-
vacy [11] is a prominent way to formalize privacy against
membership inference. It has been applied to various
machine learning models including decision trees [19],
logistic regression [41], and neural networks [4,31]. How-
ever, there are no generic methods to achieve differential
privacy for all useful machine learning models. More
importantly, even if these methods are developed, their ap-
plications to real-world machine learning problems may
significantly decrease the accuracy of the models, and
thus will reduce their utility [5].
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we take a step forward on understanding
the information leaks from machine learning models. Our
study demonstrates that overfitting contributes to the in-
formation leaks but is not the fundamental cause of the
problem. This understanding is achieved through a se-
ries of membership inference attacks on well-generalized
models, discovering vulnerable instances (cancer patients,
images, and individual data) even without directly query-
ing the vulnerable target records, and even in the presence
of regularization protection. Our study highlights the con-
tention between selecting informative training instances
and preventing their identification through their unique
influences on the model, and points to the direction of
using training data analysis and selection to complement
existing approaches.
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Appendix
Training and Testing Accuracy of Target Models. Ta-
ble 6 shows the training and testing accuracy of the target
models in our attacks. All the target models are well-
generalized models with difference between training and
testing accuracy smaller than 0.1.
Table 6: Training and Testing Accuracy of Target Models
Dataset (Model) Training Accuracy Test Accuracy
Adult 0.85±0.01 0.85
Cancer 0.95±0.04 0.94±0.03
MNIST 0.99 0.98
Adult(Google) 0.84±0.03 0.84±0.02
MNIST(Google) 0.90 0.90
Vulnerable Records in MNIST Dataset. To study what
kinds of records are vulnerable to GMIA, we plotted the
vulnerable target records selected from MNIST dataset
with δ = 0.2 and β = 0.1 (Figure 12). As we expected,
some of the vulnerable target records are outliers in the
dataset. However, some vulnerable examples actually
increase model utility by providing rare but useful features
for the classification task. For example, the images of
digit 8 written in different directions may help a model
on recognizing similar written digits in testing examples.
However, since these images are rare in the dataset, they
have a unique influence on the target models, making
them vulnerable to GMIA, and the fact that this influence
is useful in predicting unseen examples does not mitigate
the risk.
Figure 12: Vulnerable Examples in MNIST Dataset
Indirect Inference on MNIST Dataset. To study the
correlation between a target record and its enhancing
records in indirect inferences, we plotted the target record
with its enhancing records in the MNIST dataset 13. Sur-
prisingly, the enhancing records seem like images of ran-
dom noise and by no means represent the target record.
Figure 13: Vulnerable record from MNIST with its two enhancing
records.
Intuitions on GMIA. Figure 14 shows a vulnerable
record’s influence on the machine learning model’s pre-
dictions on itself. The image of the record is plotted in
Figure 13. All the positive reference models (i.e., refer-
ence models trained with the target record) predict high
15
probability for the correct class label while all the ref-
erence models (i.e., models trained without the target
record) predict low probability for the correct class la-
bel. This difference allows us to successfully infer the
presence of this record in the training dataset.
Figure 14: The histogram of predictions on r∗ when r∗ is in the training
dataset (i.e., positive reference models) v.s. not in the training dataset
(i.e., reference models)
Comparison with the Prior MIA. To compare with the
prior MIA [32], we reproduced the attack in [32] on the
same target models and same vulnerable records in GMIA.
Specifically, we trained one attack classifier per class for
each dataset. The attack classifiers are neural networks
with one hidden layer of 64 units. We used ReLU as the
activation function and SoftMax as the output layer. We
only performed the attack when the probability given by
the attack classifier was higher than a certain threshold
(called attack confidence threshold). We evaluated the
performance of the attack under various attack threshold
as shown in Table 7. The attack precision was relatively
low (e.g. < 70%) on all three datasets even when a high
attack confidence threshold was used.
Table 7: Performance of the Prior MIA on the Same Target
Models
Dataset Attack ConfidenceThreshold Attack Precision Attack Recall
Cancer
(3 records)
0.8 50.25% 40%
0.9 - 0
Adult
(13 records)
0.6 66.67% 4.92%
0.7 - 0
MNIST
(16 records)
0.6 50% 56.25%
0.7 19.6% 6.25%
0.8 - 0
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